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Ecolabels:  The Link Between Environmental
Preferences and Green Practices?
Audrae Erickson and Carol S. Kramer-LeBlanc1
Introduction
Many consumers exhibit preferences for environmental amenities, either directly through polls or
surveys, or indirectly, by participating in outdoor activities, environmental organizations or causes, or
undertaking conservation, recycling, or other stewardship activities.  Generally missing, until recently,
has been the opportunity for consumers to cast meaningful votes in the market for goods and services,
to differentiate among products on the basis of environmentally sound production and management
techniques.  Because consumers cannot know how goods were produced, information problems may
result in inefficiencies and lead to social welfare losses.
On the supply side of the market, in the absence of a labeling program, producers’ inability to
capture the rewards of environmentally superior performance mitigates against its supply.  At the same
time, negative external effects associated with normal production may pass unnoticed due to information
problems; an example is nonpoint source pollution.  Finally, should producers attempt to self-certify or
promote their own-products as environmentally responsible, they also face risks that regulatory
authorities or rival competitors will challenge environmental claims in court or in the press.  When
market information problems result in significant inefficiencies and economic losses, theory suggests that
welfare might be enhanced through “green” or ecolabeling programs provided that labels are factual and
the benefits of labeling exceed its costs.
Thus far, the U.S. market for agricultural and food products has been relatively unaffected by
“green” or ecolabeling, with the exception of organics, a type of ecolabel, discussed below.  There are
signs that this condition may change in the future, however.  Producer groups and state agencies have
begun to articulate an argument for designating environmentally friendly production practices and
designing label and informational programs that would inform consumers about the link to environ-
mental practices.  U.S. firms realize that ecolabeling programs in other countries could affect U.S.
exports significantly, including food and agricultural products.  In response, U.S. agribusiness firms are
developing information about the merits and weaknesses of some of the existing programs around the
world and are beginning to lobby for federal support.
This paper discusses some of the economic issues associated with ecolabeling programs, examines
consumer and producer interests in ecolabeling, identifies some categories of label-related costs and
benefits, and describes selected ecolabeling programs from the international experience.  The Economic
Research Service has recently initiated a cooperative research effort to examine economic issues involved
in using ecolabeling as the link between consumers’ market choices and producers’ adoption of
certifiably sustainable practices in the agricultural and food sectors in the United States.196
Consumer Interests in Ecolabeling 
Consumer awareness of the environment and preferences for more environmentally benign products
appears to be growing steadily around the developed world and in selected developing countries.  Various
U.S. polls indicate that the percentage of consumers with a strong degree of environmental awareness
ranges from 37-96 percent (EPA 1994).  The growth of certification programs around the world also
suggests a rise in consumer preferences for environmental responsibility (Tables 15-1-15.3).  Finally,
market introductions of goods labeled to connote environmental superiority have increased in the 1990s.
Claims include, among others, biodegradable or recycled materials; wood products from sustainably
managed forests; energy efficient computers, vehicles, or appliances; reduced emissions; no-animal
testing/cruelty-free beauty aids; and ozone-friendly aerosols.  Two dominant environmental themes
applied to agriculture relate to chemicals used in food production or processing, and to animal welfare.
The growth of the organics market for food and fiber products produced without synthetic chemicals,
most importantly, as well as intermediate products produced with “reduced” pesticides or Integrated Pest
Management practices illustrates the former theme while “dolphin-safe” tuna, “free-range” poultry, or
vegetarian foods, in general, illustrate the latter.
Although consumer preferences for environmentally superior products may have expanded, con-
sumers’ ability to discern whether or not a product has been produced in an environmentally sound
manner remains tenuous.  In conventional markets, to inform themselves consumers rely on the organo-
leptically evident features of a product, on labels which contain nutrition or ingredient information, on
advertising, or on referrals from other consumers or consumer education about the product or company’s
practices.  Rarely do they receive information about the product’s eco-characteristics.  Producers, on the
other hand, are often extremely knowledgeable about many aspects of their products including the
production technology, input quality, product performance capabilities, and, sometimes, eco-
characteristics.  Knowledge is asymmetrically held and, in the end, imperfect.  Even for producers,
achieving a scientific understanding of the relationship among agricultural practices and healthy
ecosystems (what is the indicator?) is not a trivial or a typical event.
Adherents  believe  that providing additional information to consumers by labeling goods as
environmentally sound or possessing environmentally superior characteristics can help minimize the
asymmetry of information.  Environmental labels may enable consumers to articulate their preferences
for an embodied environmental characteristic of the good.  Ecolabeling advocates presume consumers
will pay price premia for goods with environmentally superior characteristics, thereby stimulating a
supply response.
Various economists have conceptualized consumer utility and choice as based fundamentally on the
attributes of a product.  Lancaster’s (1966) characteristics approach to consumer utility and Hammitt’s
(1986) hedonic method to estimate consumer willingness-to-pay premiums assume consumers derive
utility from a good’s characteristics; for example, appearance, taste, and function.  Goods usually
possess multiple characteristics with many goods sharing the same characteristic.  The hedonic method
characterizes the price of the good as the sum of the good’s attribute values.  Such models of consumer
utility can be easily modified to include the consumer’s preference for goods with environmentally
superior characteristics, with and without labeling.  Only those consumers with environmental pref-
erences will experience utility increases with the purchase of products perceived to be less harmful to
the environment.  Concerned consumers will base purchase decisions on the price premia associated with
environmentally sensitive goods; they will purchase environmentally sensitive goods up to the point
where the marginal benefits of environmental consumerism equal marginal costs, represented by the
price premia.
In the presence of market information asymmetry, consumers must rely on product information to
inform them of a product’s attributes.  The challenge in designing ecolabeling programs is generating
information that is, simultaneously, preferred by consumers, credible with respect to environmental
claims made and the certification process used, nondiscriminatory in global markets (or at least GATT-
legal), and cost-effective for producers.TABLE 15.1  Overview of Environmental Labeling Programs (as of Mid 1996)
Program Name Country Founded Categories Awarded pation ship
Date Product Products Partici- Sponsor-
# of # of
Seal of Approval
(1) Blue Angel Germany 1978 81 4,353 Voluntary Public
(2) Environmental Choice Program Canada 1988 47 1,500 Voluntary Public
(3) Ecomark Japan 1989 65 2,322 Voluntary Public
(4) Nordic Swan Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland 1989 40 287 Voluntary Public
(5) Green Seal U.S. 1989 20 245 Voluntary Private
(6) Good Environmental Choice Sweden 1990 26 695 Voluntary Private
(7) Ecomark India 1991 16 0 Voluntary Public
(8) Ecomark Korea 1992 12 0 Voluntary Public
(9) Green Label Singapore Singapore 1992 7 0 Voluntary Public
(10) Environmental Labeling
Programme European Commission 1992 10 7 Voluntary Public
(11) Stitchting Milieukeur Netherlands 1992 20 40 Voluntary Public
(12) NF-Environnement France 1992 2 0 Voluntary Public
(13) Green Mark Program Taiwan 1992 33 342 Voluntary Public
(14) Flipper Seal of Approval International 1992 1 8 Voluntary Private 
(15) SCS Forest Conservation Program U.S. 1993 2 29 Voluntary Private 
(16) Czech National Program Czech Republic 1993 12 150 Voluntary Public
(17) Certified Eco Profile U.S. 1991 Open 17 Voluntary Private
Source:  Nathan Denman.  U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, June 1996.TABLE 15.2  Certification Characteristics of Environmental Labeling Programs (as of Mid 1996)




(1) Blue Angel 300 DM for application; annual fee of
350-3980 DM based on turnover of the
labeled product. National Yes No N/A
(2) Environmental Choice $2000 CDN application fee; 0.5% on the
Program first $1,000,000 CDN sales; 0.1% on the
remainder. International Yes No 20%
(3) Ecomark License and annual fees from 40,000 to
100,000 yen.  Both fees depend on price of
product. National Yes No N/A
(4) Nordic Swan Application fee of $2000 U.S. and annual
fee of 0.4% of estimated annual turnover
of product. Multi-national Yes No N/A
(5) Green Seal Evaluation costs vary on product being
certified. International Yes Yes 15-20%
(6) Good Environmental One time $5000 SEK for the first product
Choice and $1500 for each additional product.  National Yes No 10-15%
(7) Ecomark  Small licensing fee.  Average testing fee of
$1700 U.S. National Yes No N/A
(8) Ecomark Manufacturer pays a fee ranging from
300,000 won to 1,000,000 won depending
on sales. National Yes No N/A
(continues)TABLE 15.2 (continued)
Program Name Certification Fee Certifier Certified Certifier Quantity
Foreign Recognizes
Products Foreign Threshold
(9) Green Label Singapore Manufacturer pays $20.00 a year.  May be
exempt for first 3-5 years. National Yes No N/A
(10) Environmental Labeling 500 ECUs and 0.15% of annual volume of
Programme sales. Multi-national Yes No 20%
(11) Stitchting Milieukeur Annual fee. National Yes No Limited
(12) NF-Environnement Registration fee of 12,500 Francs.  Annual
royalty payment of 0.1% of the product
sales. National Yes No N/A
(13) Green Mark Program Application fee of U.S. $725 per applica-
tion per company:  0 annual fee. National Yes Yes None
(14) Flipper Seal of Approval Annual licensing fee. International Yes No N/A
(15) SCS Forest Conservation Costs based on time and materials ex-
Program pended in administering the evaluation. International Yes Yes 80 Points
(16) Czech National Program Application fee 7,000 Czech Crowns and a
percentage of the production volume or
annual sales. National Yes No N/A
(17) Certified Eco Profile Testing fees only. International Yes Yes Report Card
Source:  Nathan Denman.  U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, June 1996.TABLE 15.3  Other Environmental Labeling Programs (as of Mid 1996)




Energy Star Computers Program U.S. 1992 Voluntary Public Manufacturer/Importer Yes N/A
NutriClean U.S. 1984 Voluntary Private SCS Yes No
Chilean Ozone Seal of Apporval Chile 1996 Voluntary Public Nat. Corp. for the Env. Yes N/A
Negative Labeling
Pesticide Labeling U.S. 1975 Mandatory Public Manufacturer/Importer Yes N/A
Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) Labeling U.S. 1976 Mandatory Public Manufacturer/Importer Yes N/A
Proposition 65 California 1986 Mandatory Public Manufacturer/Importer Yes N/A
Household Hazardous Product
Shelf Labeling Vermont 1991 Mandatory Public Retailer Yes N/A
Ozone Depleting Substance
(ODS) Label U.S. 1993 Mandatory Public Manufacturer/Importer Yes N/A
Information Disclosure
Energy Guide U.S. 1975 Mandatory Public Manufacturer/Importer Yes N/A
Fuel Economy Information
Program U.S. 1975 Mandatory Public NVFEL Yes No
Source:  Nathan Denman.  U. S. Department of Agriculture, Economic  Research Service, June 1996.201
Depending on the price premium of the ecolabeled good and consumers’ willingness to pay, eco-
labeling could result in increased revealed demand for ecosensitive products.  Ecolabeling advocates
believe that increased demand for ecolabeled goods may result in a positive supply response leading
ultimately to increased use of environmentally sound producer practices and a better environment.  On
a more negative note, an excess supply of ecolabeled goods could result in a bidding away of any price
premium, or an excess demand for environmentally inferior or unlabeled goods (Mattoo and Singh
1994).  In other words, the dynamic outcome of mismatched supply and demand could be perverse.
Producer Interests in Ecolabeling:  Supply Considerations  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that agricultural producers hold mixed views about ecolabeling.
Recently, some agricultural groups informally requested the Department of Agriculture to support an
environmental labeling program in cases where domestic producers are required to comply with Best
Management Practices to improve the environment.  These producers wish to receive market recognition
for “green” practices or investments in technology.  They also wish to differentiate their products from
imports not meeting the same criteria.  On the other hand, some producers have voiced concern that even
a voluntary Integrated Pest Management certification program (piloted in Massachusetts) could evolve
into a mandatory certification program as did the organics program.
Any producer confronting a market where consumers demand ecosensitive production must decide
whether to adopt the technology and whether and how to certify.  Management decisions depend on start-
up and operating costs associated with the new technology, the assessment of market potential, and likely
regulatory action in the short and longer term, including the costs of certification and labeling.  In
addition, some businesses risk legal costs from competitors if they are forced to verify claims in court.
In agricultural markets such as the organic market, significant costs associated with transition from
conventional to environmentally sound practices may discourage producers from converting.  Ongoing
costs of production may compare with or surpass conventional methods.  Other program-related costs
include labeling, packaging, certification costs, and ecolabeling fees.  In the longer run, ecolabeling may
elicit possible changes in producer practices and increases in the availability of green technology.  The
key issue for the firm is market viability, and positive effects on long-term profitability.  In a recent
review, EPA found that in selected cases, environmental certification strategies had been successful for
the firms that adopted them (EPA 1994).
Ecolabeling Programs
Not surprisingly, the interaction of consumer and producer concerns around the world has spawned
a multitude of labeling and certification program designs proliferating across sectors and nations.
International Experience
Since Germany’s national Blue Angel Program began in 1978, more than two dozen additional
programs have started.  These include national programs in Canada, Japan, Sweden, New Zealand,
Netherlands, France, Taiwan, Australia, India, Korea, and Singapore.  Multinational programs are
established in the European Union and several Nordic countries.  The structure of ecolabeling programs
differs markedly across countries and sectors with respect to the level of government involvement and
the participation of private interests.  Some programs are administered entirely by government—an
example is FIFRA pesticide certification by the EPA in the United States—while others mix public and
private administration.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture is issuing final rules for National Organic202
Standards.  An example of a mixed program is Canada’s Environmental Choice program.  This program
was established by Canada’s Ministry of the Environment but has been turned over to a private organi-
zation, Terra Choice.  Programs run entirely by private sector companies or associations include both
international and domestic examples.  The United States has two privately managed ecolabeling and
certification programs:  Green Seal and Scientific Certification Systems (formerly Green Cross).  In some
instances the government attempts to influence the market through its own procurement policies:
President Clinton has charged the EPA to issue guidance for executive agencies when purchasing goods
and services (Executive Order 12873, Federal Acquisition, Recycling, and Waste Prevention, Sections
201 and 503).  The EPA certifies computers with its Energy-Star.  The European Union recently issued
an eco-label for copy paper for which, U.S. papermakers say, few non-European papers qualify but
which could hurt foreign manufacturers if the E.U. buys only eco-labeled paper.
Some environmental labeling programs cover individual products or technologies and are run by
private concerns:  an example is the “Dolphin-safe” label coordinated by the Flipper Seal of Approval
Program.
Perhaps the most important development relating to ecolabeling programs will be the standards
established by the International Standards Organization, ISO 14000.  ISO is comprised of representa-
tives of 120 countries’ national standards organizations.  Voluntary standards covering environmental
management systems, auditing, performance evaluation, labeling and Life Cycle Analysis are being
established by ISO 14000.
Ecolabeling Program Types
Ecolabeling programs can be characterized along different dimensions (U.S. EPA 1993).  Producers
(and consumers) may have mixed reactions to these depending on whether they are compulsory or
voluntary, private or public, single or multiple attribute, costly or inexpensive, and whether they reflect
the heterogeneous needs that producers may confront due to distinct commodity conditions or natural
resource characteristics of their own producing regions.
With voluntary programs, producers may choose between first- or third party certification.  In the
former case, producers self-certify, resulting in a type of advertising or environmental marketing.
Commonly, proliferation of environmental claims leads to movement toward either voluntary or
mandatory third party certification, as the public demands clarification and substantiation of confusing
product claims.  In the U.S. agricultural market for organics, nonuniform state and private certification
programs led to a push for national organic standards, which is only now being realized.  In contrast to
organic labels which connote voluntary disclosure of practices believed to be positive environmentally,
a different ecolabel approach is the mandatory warning labels required on pesticide packaging under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
Another distinction among programs is whether they base criteria on a single or on multiple
attributes.  Seals of approval (ecoseals) tend to concentrate on a single attribute with the ecoseal logo
awarded to product manufacturers that meet a specific criterion concerning reduced environmental
impacts.  Examples include specifying energy efficiency ratings, or “CFC-free,” or “containing recycled
paper.”  The seal becomes a recognizable symbol to consumers that the product contains an environ-
mentally friendly (though limited) characteristic.  Multi-attribute certification, termed “report card” or
“eco profile” ecolabels, by contrast, attempt to categorize and quantify various impacts of the product’s
manufacture, use, and disposal on the environment.  These may employ a “life-cycle” analysis, discussed
below.  Report card ecolabels resemble some aspects of now familiar nutrition labels found on food
packages.  The report card approach provides the consumer with more information than a single-attribute
logo and attempts to better indicate the overall environmental impact of the product.
Many of the ecoseal programs are based on life-cycle analysis (LCA) which attempts to reflect the
net effect of a product’s impact on the environment throughout manufacture, use, and disposal.  LCA203
methodology has not reached a state of consensus yet, however, and remains highly controversial in the
scientific community, which has not determined if and how such an analytical system could be broadly
operationalized.  In the meantime, seal of approval programs based on LCA may result in disputed or
misleading claims and leave open the potential for antitrust lawsuits.  Firms offering nonecolabeled
goods could easily raise a legal challenge to the hard-to-measure scientific approaches used for life-cycle
analysis labels.
Policy Considerations
Ecolabeled goods convey a message to the consumer that the product was produced under environ-
mentally sound conditions.  Consumers purchase the product with the belief that using the ecolabeled
product instead of the nonecolabeled good will benefit the environment.  Producers, on the other hand,
seek to differentiate their product and capture market share in the growing consumer popularity of
ecolabeled goods.  Producers may make strategic environmental claims even though they are not well
versed in the science behind the eco-certification process.  Alternatively, they may rely on third party
certifiers to furnish the scientific verification for the ecolabel.
Even single attribute claims are subject to litigation.  In 1990, the Federal Trade Commission
charged a major supermarket chain in southern California with misrepresentation to consumers by falsely
claiming that its produce was pesticide free.  As part of the legal agreement reached, the supermarket
chain agreed not to misrepresent future pesticide claims or the effects of pesticides used in the food it
sells unless it had competent and reliable scientific data to substantiate its claim.
Between August 1990 and March 1996, the FTC investigated and won 32 environmental claim
cases.  Many involved single attribute claims such as “biodegradable,” “CFC free,” and “recyclable.”
However, the FTC also brought suits against broader claims including “environmentally safe,” “environ-
mentally friendly,” and “environmentally responsible.”
In its Guide for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (1992), the FTC advises how to avoid
violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act which prohibits unfair or deceptive advertising claims.  Four basic
principles are highlighted:  that claims be sufficiently clear and prevent deception; that they clarify
whether or not they pertain to the product; that they not overstate an environmental attribute or benefit;
and that comparative claims be presented clearly so as to avoid consumer deception.
A reasonable conclusion for producers to draw concerning ecolabels is that claims should be science-
based and verifiable.  Specific claims made for a particular product should be clear, pertain explicitly
to the ecolabeled product only, and not be misleading or deceptive to consumers.  Employing green
labeling as a competitive strategy, without well-founded scientific knowledge, may be easily discredited
and risky for firms to undertake.  Providing general information as many ecoseals do could be misleading
to the consumer and potentially result in lawsuits by competitors seeking damages.
Controlling the Supply of Ecolabels
Administrators of ecolabeling programs must determine how to establish standards and the resultant
effects of product criteria on the supply, demand, and market-clearing conditions for ecolabeled goods.
A recent study postulates that awarding ecolabels to more products than those for which there is demand
by environmentally concerned consumers could result in excess demand for nonecolabeled goods and
a resulting, if perverse, increase in the supply of environmentally inferior goods (Mattoo and Singh
1994).
Some established programs control the supply of ecolabels at a threshold quantity.  Both Canada’s
Environmental Choice Program and the European Union’s Environmental Labeling Program limit204
ecolabels to 20 percent of products in a qualifying product category.  Ecolabels granted by Green Seal
in the United States and Good Environmental Choice in Sweden are also awarded to only 10 to 20
percent of products.  Ideally, policymakers would consider consumer preferences and the likely demand
and supply schedules for “green” versus conventional goods when denoting ecolabeling criteria and
awarding seals to assure that ecolabels awarded per product category are in rough alignment with
demand by environmentally concerned consumers.
International Trade and Ecolabeling: Current Policy Discussions
Many of the current international ecolabeling programs focus on national products and national
environmental standards.  As a consequence, they may discriminate, unwittingly or intentionally, against
foreign imports.  With the reduction of subsidies and import quotas ratified in the Uruguay Round of the
GATT, there is a greater concern that countries will adopt nontariff barriers to replace these previously
legitimate barriers to trade.  Among the possible nontariff trade barriers likely to be implemented are
packaging and labeling standards.
The potential for environmental labeling schemes to result in unnecessary and undesirable obstacles
to trade has prompted consideration of ecolabels by the World Trade Organization’s Committee on
Trade and Environment (CTE).  Countries represented on the committee are concerned that foreign
producers will face higher costs of participation, inadequate access to information, inconsistent product
labeling requirements across countries, and an inability to participate in the development of product
criteria.  In addition, the incorporation of life-cycle analysis based on evaluations of country-specific
production or processing methods could reflect unique national production factors or technologies and
become barriers to entry for foreign products.  Such barriers could be a source for potential protectionist
abuse and trade discrimination.
The U.S. delegation to the CTE tabled a proposal in February 1996 to allow interested parties to
participate in the development of labeling programs and criteria, with the purpose of increasing the
transparency of ecolabeling programs and reducing the potential for trade discrimination.  The proposal
would provide for timely public input in the design of ecolabeling programs, the selection of products
and product criteria, the development of scientific analysis used in criteria development, and the
methodology by which foreign producer practices are taken into account when determining product
eligibility.  Increased transparency and public participation during the formative stages of programs and
criteria could mitigate trade disputes involving ecolabels and increase the legitimacy of ecolabeling
programs.
Some producer groups are concerned that transparency alone will not ensure that ecolabeling
programs are not used for protectionist ends, however.  To further protect foreign producers from trade
discrimination, the Coalition for Truth in Environmental Marketing Information, an association of 2,900
U.S. manufacturers consisting of grocery, chemicals, textile, cosmetic and fragrance, forestry, aluminum,
plastic, electronic, packaging, and soap and detergent producers, is seeking WTO enforceable rules on
ecolabeling.  Included in these proposed rules are principles that promote transparency and participation
in each stage of ecolabeling criteria development, nondiscrimination between domestic and foreign
producers, and ecolabeling claims that are truthful, substantiated, scientifically tested, and not misleading
to consumers.
Several countries favor mutual recognition of ecolabeling programs and international harmonization
of procedures to mitigate the trade impacts of ecolabeling.  Although these objectives are not likely to
be achieved in the near future, increased transparency remains the most achievable short-term outcome
of the CTE.205
Environmental Labeling in Agriculture—The Case of Organic Practices
Prior to 1989, the organic foods market was a small, slowly growing segment of the agricultural
sector.  The demand for organic produce stemmed largely from environmentally conscientious con-
sumers, environmentalists, and advocates of organic farming.  Agricultural research efforts during this
time did not address organic farming issues and agricultural policy distinctly favored conventional
farming.  Natural food cooperatives were the primary suppliers of organic produce.
Awareness of agricultural chemical use in the nation’s food supply changed in 1989 as a result of
food safety scares associated with apples contaminated with Alar, and tainted Chilean grapes.  Consumer
concern about pesticide residues in food reached a climax and a dramatic increase in the demand for
organic foods ensued.  Following these incidents, the supply of organic foods extended beyond food
cooperatives to include farmers’ markets, major grocery stores, and dedicated organic food chains.
However, grocery stores were unable to stock sufficient supplies of organic produce, which caused
organic prices to rise, curtailing demand.  Organic prices exceeded the price premium that consumers
were willing to pay.  Shorter shelf-life and a higher rate of cosmetic defects, coupled with a declining
demand, caused grocers to allocate less and less store space to organic produce.
With respect to labeling, prior to 1990 many producers used the terms “natural” and “organic” on
their produce and processed foods quite liberally.  Inconsistency, misconceptions on the part of
consumers, and even fraudulent claims by suppliers to earn the price premium associated with organic
produce, brought standardization and certification issues to the forefront.  Some states established laws
regulating the use of the term “organic,” employing the term “certified organic” to regain consumer
confidence in the label and to signify a standardized certification process.  However, inconsistency
between states persisted.  In addition, producers in states without organic labeling laws often self-
certified.  The need for consistency in organic labeling led to provisions on organic labeling in the 1990
federal farm bill.  Stringent rules regulating the use of the organic label with significant fines for
violations were to come into effect October 1, 1993 as a result of the legislation.  Final implementation
of the legislation has taken considerably longer, but appears imminent at this writing.
Lessons for Agriculture
The history of green labels is relatively short, and their application to agriculture and food markets
has been relatively limited.  Nevertheless, the dynamic nature of program growth and experience
worldwide as well as the organic case suggest some possible hypotheses as well as challenges for
agricultural ecolabeling.
The potential market for “green” food products is currently largely unknown.  Probably more is
known about the market for organic foods than any other type, but even here information is extremely
limited.  Whether market promise exists for an ecolabel associated with local production—for example,
“Everglades-friendly tomatoes”—is unknown.
Furthermore, applying environmental labeling to agricultural and food products is not simple.  Many
practices and technologies affect environmental quality, but these vary over the landscape.  Chemical use
is frequently highlighted, but the risks associated with chemicals are to some degree product, site, and
practice specific.  Similarly, nutrient use and recycling have adverse impacts in some locations but not
in others.  What becomes necessary is to develop sets of appropriate best management practices which
can be tailored to natural resource conditions and environmental needs.
On the positive side, the Department of Agriculture is working to promulgate standards for organics.
Similarly, it is working to promote acceptance of IPM on 75 percent of crop acreage by 2000, although
neither uniform specification of IPM nor a labeling and certification program is envisioned.  Finally, in
environmentally sensitive ecosystems, the Clinton Administration has proposed numerous policy boards206
to coordinate policies so that ecosystems can be better managed in a holistic manner to maintain or
restore system health.  Some decision makers have at least broached the possibility that a program
identifying Best Management Practices could be coupled with a certification and labeling program to
permit producers to compete on the basis of environmental stewardship.  Likely, the challenges of
developing a recognized labeling scheme based on application of heterogeneous practice standards will
be formidable.
Policy development in the United States thus far suggests that developing such a label or such
guidelines will depend on achieving agreement and success on the relevant environmental practices, the
validity of the claims, and the manner in which consumers can use such information to make meaningful
decisions.  The Federal Trade Commission, with the support of the Environmental Protection Agency,
has tended to favor using product claims that can be substantiated rather than simple seals of approval.
From an international trade perspective, the use of substantial and verifiable claims in ecolabeling
programs is certain to surface in deliberations of the Committee on Trade and Environment in the WTO
as well.  However, foreign and domestic producer participation in each stage of an ecolabeling program
is the most likely short-term outcome for multilateral agreement.
Note
Carol S. Kramer-LeBlanc is Staff Director, Nutrition Policy and Analysis, Center for Nutrition 1
Policy and Promotion, USDA and was formerly Associate Director, Deputy Director, and Branch Chief,
Natural Resources and Environment Division, Economic Research Service, USDA.  Audrae Erickson
is Economist, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, on leave from the Economic Research Service.
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